1. 포스트 펜데믹 시대의 요청된 당위: '디지털 네이티브성'

2. 당위⋅역량 원칙으로 본 디지털 네이티브 논제

3. 탄트와 당위⋅역량 원칙

4. 인공지능 시대, 근거로서의 믿음의 가치

This study reconstructs Prensky's discourse on digital natives within the framework of the ethical principle "ought implies can" and examines its implications. First, the general understanding of the "ought implies can" principle is reviewed, and then Prensky's digital native thesis is reformulated as an argument grounded in this principle. The analysis suggests that the relationship between "ought" and "can" in the digital native thesis is not unidirectional but reciprocal, and that it is based on the philosophical frameworks of reductionism and posthumanism. Second, several representative passages that characterize the modern ethical formulation of the "ought implies can" principle by Kant are analyzed. This analysis indicates that, similar to the digital native thesis, the Kantian "ought implies can" principle presupposes reciprocity between capacity and obligation, which is grounded in transcendental realism. Building on these two lines of argument, this study concludes that just as the Kantian "ought implies can" principle cannot be accepted if it departs from its foundation in transcendental realism, the digital native thesis cannot be justified if it departs from its technological-absolutist perspective. Moreover, even if such a deviation were acceptable, it would not necessarily follow that the digital native thesis should be adopted as an obligation.