Can practical reason be artificial? Dieter Schönecker Professor of Philosophy, University of Siegen Can practical reason be artificial? The answer, from a Kantian point of view, is clearly negative: Practical reason cannot be artificial. After a preliminary remark on the possibility of Kantian moral machines (1.1) and some basics on the concept of practical reason (1.2) and Kant’s intuitionism (1.3), I will argue that in a Kantian model of moral obligation, the typical (human) moral subject has moral feelings and must have them in order to cognize the validity of the moral law as a categorical imperative (1.3). Using the knowledge argument against physicalism and functionalism, I shall argue that computers have no feelings and, a fortiori, no moral feelings; therefore, computers are no moral subjects (1.4). This conclusion is based on a Kantian I feel rather than I think (1.5). I will then tackle two problems with this argument (2). I will conclude with an analogy (3): Just as planets do not fly, computers do not feel.
Key words：artificial intelligence, practical reason, moral feelings, I think vs. I feel, knowledge argument |
